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I. Introduction
Shareholder activism—using an equity stake in a corporation
to influence management 1—has become a popular tool to
effectuate social change in the twenty-first century. Increasingly,
activists are looking beyond financial performance to demand
better corporate performance in such areas as economic inequality,
civil rights, human rights, discrimination, and diversity. 2 These
efforts take many forms: publicity campaigns, litigation, proxy
battles, shareholder resolutions, and negotiations with corporate
management. 3 However, a consensus on scope is lacking. Should
1. See
James
Chen,
Shareholder
Activist,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shareholderactivist.asp (last updated
June 25, 2019) (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (describing ways in which shareholders
influence corporate behavior by exercising rights as partial owners) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See id. (observing some shareholder activists call for social change by
“requiring divestment from politically sensitive parts of the world . . .[,] greater
support of workers’ rights[,] . . . [and] more accountability for environmental
degradation”).
3. See, e.g., Courtenay Brown, Wall Street Plays Nice with Shareholder
Activists, Axios (June 21, 2019), https://www.axios.com/wall-street-activistshareholders-pressure-b61aaf76-9442-40fc-a7df-c49132ce3b35.html (last visited
Sept. 23, 2019) (explaining the various public and private ways shareholder
activists push for change within companies) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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corporations change their own operations to reflect a specific
agenda or use their power to influence society on a much broader
scale? Distinctions between private and public become blurred in
light of the ubiquitous and inevitable influence corporations wield
over
third
parties.
Theoretical
absolutes
on
the
individualist-communitarian spectrum may underestimate the
complex co-dependent and co-responsible interrelationship
between corporations and modern society. Critics may fairly
question why corporations, arguably society’s most potent
institutions, should sit idle on problems like civil rights.
In 1948, as part of the “Proxies Campaign,” James Peck and
Bayard Rustin each purchased a single share of Greyhound
Corporation and proposed, albeit unsuccessfully, that Greyhound
desegregate its bus lines. 4 Rustin organized both the 1947
“Journey of Reconciliation” and the subsequent “Freedom Rides”
to integrate interstate bus travel in the South; Peck participated
in both. 5 From 1948 to 1955, Peck and others attended the
Greyhound Company’s annual stockholder meetings to protest and
to argue for desegregated busing. 6 The shareholder activism of the
“Proxies Campaign” was just one lever in a massive challenge to
4. See Sarah Haan, Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism: SEC v. Medical
Committee for Human Rights, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1167, 1214 (2019); Richard
Marens, Inventing Corporate Governance: The Mid-Century Emergence of
Shareholder Activism, 8 J. BUS. & MGMT. 365, 371–72, 382 (2002) (chronicling and
assessing shareholder activism from 1933 to 1953). For background on Bayard
Rustin, see Eric Pace, Bayard Rustin is Dead at 75; Pacifist and a Rights Activist,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1987, at A1 (obituary). For background on James Peck, see
Eric Pace, James Peck, 78, Union Organizer Who Promoted Civil Rights Causes,
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1993, at B7 (Peck obituary).
5. See DEREK CHARLES CATSAM, FREEDOM’S MAIN LINE: THE JOURNEY OF
RECONCILIATION AND THE FREEDOM RIDES 13–46 (2009) (recounting the “Journey
of Reconciliation,” a four-state bus tour in which activists challenged
discrimination in busing and other forms of public transportation); see also
Interview with James Peck, Eyes on the Prize: America’s Civil Rights Years
(1954–1965), WASH. U. FILM & MEDIA ARCHIVE (Oct. 26, 1979),
http://digital.wustl.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=eop;cc=eop;rgn=main;view=text;
idno=pec0015.0499.082 (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (discussing the origin of the
Freedom Rides) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. See Marens, supra note 4, at 372, 382 (describing how James Peck sued
Greyhound “to force it to include his resolution [on seating desegregation] in the
company’s proxy statement” and despite losing this lawsuit, “achieved his real
goal of publicizing the issue of segregation”).
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Jim Crow segregation. 7 Peck, however, is best known for more
direct forms of nonviolent resistance and the price he paid in over
sixty arrests and brutal beatings at the hands of segregationist
thugs. 8 In a sense, Peck’s long legacy of activism reflects the
virtues of mixed-methods in addressing meta-problems of racial
segregation. He debated NAACP Director Roy Wilkins, arguing
that direct action was just as critical as legal procedures in
winning civil rights. 9
Direct resistance, as exemplified in the Greensboro sit-in, and
strategies like the “Proxies Campaign” coincided with civil rights
litigation that would change the course of U.S. history and
democracy. 10 The 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education 11
declared the segregation of public schools unconstitutional,
7. See generally JOHN LEWIS & MICHAEL D’ORSO, WALKING IN THE WIND: A
MEMOIR OF THE MOVEMENT (1998) (narrating pivotal events in the civil rights
movement); CATSAM, supra note 5.
8. See Pace, supra note 4 (Peck obituary).
9. See YVONNE RYAN & ROY WILKINS, THE QUIET REVOLUTIONARY AND THE
NAACP 58 (2014). Based on several letters between Wilkins and Peck, Ryan
notes,
Peck argued that the court case [ruling state bus segregation was
unconstitutional] “certainly was not the major [factor] in the
Montgomery situation. Without the peoples’ protest action, the buses
would still be segregated, despite the court case—just as interstate
buses in the South remain segregated despite the Supreme Court.”
Wilkins rejected Peck’s argument: “Montgomery had a happy
combination of elements that would make a boycott successful, and
such a combination does not exist everywhere.” Furthermore, Wilkins
defended the Association’s reliance on legal action as one of its primary
means of agitation.
Id. Peck continued to pressure Wilkins to “take the initiative in pursing boycotts
and, more importantly, move to expand the sphere of NAACP activities outside of
litigations and lobbying and embracing the nonviolent protest.” Id. at 77.
However, “Wilkins simply reiterated his belief that the success blacks had
experienced in Montgomery was the result of the lawsuit, not the mass action,
and argued that the threat of white reprisals . . . made the advocacy of actions
such as boycotts wantonly dangerous.” Id.
10. See ALDON MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK
COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE 13–16 (1984) (analyzing the NAACP’s
tactics, structure, and role in the civil rights movement); Aldon Morris, Black
Southern Student Sit-in Movement: An Analysis of Internal Organization, 46 AM.
SOC. REV. 744, 751 (1981) (analyzing Greensboro’s role in catalyzing the sit-in
movement across the outhern United States).
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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inspiring, in part, the civil rights movement demonstrations and
marches of the 1950s and 1960s. 12 Brown was not an isolated
event. It was the product of a “long range, carefully orchestrated
legal strategy developed in the 1930s by lawyers associated with
the NAACP.” 13 Generally, the NAACP’s attack on segregation was
two pronged: legal action and persuasion. 14 Charles Hamilton
Houston and Nathan Margold were the architects of the legal
strategy to dismantle Jim Crow segregation in all aspects of
American life. 15 Litigation by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
(LDF) brought court victories but also served as a method of
protest independent of court decisions. 16
From a historical perspective, shareholder activism is best
deployed as one tool among many to advance a modern civil rights
agenda. The shareholder landscape and level of engagement have
evolved considerably since the 1950s. The biggest transformation
is the decline of individual or retail investors and the rise of
institutional
shareholders. 17
Individual
investors
held
12. See Leland Ware, Deliberate Speed: Implementing Brown’s Ambiguous
Mandate, DEL. LAW., Spring 2004, at 26, 26 (describing the role Brown played in
inspiring future protests).
13. Id.
14. See What Is the Mission of the NAACP?, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC.
FUND, INC., https://www.naacpldf.org/about-us/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2019)
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF) is
America’s premier legal organization fighting for racial justice.
Through litigation, advocacy and public education, LDF seeks
structural changes to expand democracy, eliminate disparities, and
achieve racial justice in a society that fulfills the promise of equality
for all Americans. LDF also defends the gains and protections won over
the past 75 years of civil rights struggle and works to improve the
quality and diversity of judicial and executive appointments.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Nation’s Premier Civil
Rights Organization, NAACP, https://www.naacp.org/nations-premier-civilrights-organization/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (outlining the NAACP’s history)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 451 (2004)
(illustrating Margold’s strategy of attacking segregation “as practiced” rather
than as a purely constitutional concept).
16. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 3–7 (2004) (describing victories
and setbacks in disenfranchisement litigation).
17. See generally LISA M. FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER ON
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approximately ninety percent of the United States equity market
in 1950. 18 In 2009, they held thirty-six percent and the percentage
continues to fall. 19 The individual investor ownership level that
coincided with Peck’s efforts to influence Greyhound no longer
exists. 20 Instead, institutional shareholders (e.g., mutual funds,
pension funds, and hedge funds) dominate equity markets. 21 For
example, institutional investors held only six percent of the U.S.
equity market in 1950 22 and held thirty-seven percent by 1990. 23
Today, it is estimated that institutional investors hold over eighty
percent of U.S. equity ownership. 24 This change helps to explain
the transformation from the general passivity of the diffuse,
rationally apathetic individual shareholders of the 1950s to the
present-day activism of institutional investors who can surmount
collective action challenges. 25 If willing, institutional investors can
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND PARTICIPATION (2011) (examining shareholder
activism and analyzing the debate surrounding the propriety of increased
shareholder power).
18. See Alicia J. Davis, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV.
1105, 1105 (2009) (analyzing the modern domination of United States security
markets by institutional investors).
19. See id. (adding that trades by individual investors represent less than
two percent of NYSE trading volume).
20. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the
Institutionalization of the Securities Market, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (“That the
market for corporate securities traded on the New York Stock Exchange or the
NASDAQ Global Market is no longer substantially retail in nature is now
common knowledge.”).
21. See Davis, supra note 18, at 1105 (“There is no question that U.S.
securities markets are now dominated by institutional investors.”).
22. See JANICE M. TRAFLET, A NATION OF SMALL SHAREHOLDERS: MARKETING
WALL STREET AFTER WORLD WAR II 174 (2013) (chronicling the New York Stock
Exchange’s efforts to broaden the country’s shareholder base during the Cold
War).
23. See Brian Reid, The 1990s: A Decade of Expansion and Change in the
U.S. Mutual Fund Industry, 6 INV. CO. INST. PERSP. 1, 15 (2000) (explaining
institutional investor equity ownership).
24. See Charles McGrath, 80% of Equity Market Cap Held by Institutions,
PENSIONS & INV. (Apr. 25, 2017, 11:45 AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/
20170425/INTERACTIVE/170429926/80-of-equity-market-cap-held-byinstitutions (last updated Apr. 25, 2017) (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (analyzing
institutional ownership of companies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
25. See FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 45–49 (discussing the shift to institutional
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influence corporate activities and provide additional monitoring.
However, not all engage in activism and, even when they do, they
do not engage in the same way.
This essay offers a historical account of a seminal civil rights
decision, Belton v. Gebhart, 26 in the Delaware Court of Chancery.
The circumstances surrounding the Belton case illuminate the
limits and potential of shareholder activism to bolster civil rights
in the modern context. Examining a historical civil rights example
is instructive for thinking about how shareholder activism might
advance the modern civil rights agenda.
Few modern scholars of corporate law know that Delaware
was an important battleground in the effort to advance educational
opportunity for African Americans nationwide and the Delaware
Court of Chancery’s important role. 27 Scholars naturally gravitate
to corporate cases (e.g., Van Gorkum, 28 Disney, 29 Caremark, 30 and
Revlon 31) without acknowledging the Court of Chancery’s greatest
decision, Belton v. Gebhart, which had a profound influence on
American democracy and tells a story every generation of lawyers
should learn. Two consolidated Delaware Chancery Court
cases—Belton v. Gebhart and Bulah v. Gebhart—led to the
desegregation of Delaware public schools and became part of the
monumental Brown v. Board of Education decision. 32 Notably,
these Delaware cases were the only Brown-related cases where the

shareholder dominance).
26. 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch. 1952).
27. See Matthew Albright, Wilmington Has Long, Messy Education History,
DEL. ONLINE (June 10, 2016), https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/
education/2016/06/10/wilmington-education-history/85602856/ (last visited Sept.
23, 2019) (describing the history of school desegregation in Delaware) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
28. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
29. In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005).
30. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
31. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986). See also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); Stone v. Ritter, 911
A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
32. See Steven J. Crossland, Note, Brown’s Companions: Briggs, Belton, and
Davis, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 381, 384–97 (2004) (surveying the pre-Brown
companion cases).
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NAACP won at the trial level. 33 The major protagonists in this rich
historical narrative of minority education include the
philanthropist Pierre S. du Pont, once President of E. I. du Pont
Nemours and Company and General Motors; Louis Redding and
Jack Greenberg, legendary NAACP lawyers; and Chancellor
Collins Seitz, a distinguished jurist on the Delaware Court of
Chancery.
Part II of this essay examines the Delaware Court of
Chancery’s greatest case, Belton v. Gebhart, in its contemporary
context. Part III examines the key differences between past and
present civil rights-related shareholder activism. Part IV
concludes that Belton v. Gebhart, along with its surrounding
circumstances and events, vividly illustrates that advancing civil
rights requires a range of tactics that leverage public, private, and
philanthropic resources. Shareholder activism works best as part
of a multipronged activist strategy, not as a substitute for other
types of activism. Recognizing the complex challenges associated
with advancing civil rights, this essay raises key questions about
the nascent environmental, social, and governance (ESG)
framework 34 with which scholars, practitioners, and other
observers must contend.
II. Chancery’s Greatest Case: Belton v. Gebhart
A. Historical Background
Although a tiny state, Delaware is a microcosm of the national
experience of class, race, and other concerns. It has both northern
and southern sensibilities. 35 The city of Wilmington in the north is
less than thirty miles south of Philadelphia and resembles other
33. See Albright, supra note 27 (“Alone among state judges involved in the
case, Delaware’s Collins J. Seitz ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that
separate was inherently unequal after personally visiting many schools.”).
34. See infra Part III.B.1 (defining ESG framework).
35. See generally BRETT GADSDEN, BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH: DELAWARE,
DESEGREGATION, AND THE MYTH OF AMERICAN SECTIONALISM (2013) (chronicling
the three-decades-long struggle over segregated schooling in Delaware, a key
border state and important site of civil rights activism and white reaction).
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Rust Belt cities both aesthetically and culturally. 36 It is the
professional and industrial center of the entire state: a hub for
banks, chemical companies, and corporate lawyers. 37 By contrast,
southern Delaware’s local economy is dominated by agriculture
and tourism near the coast. 38 It is small-town America. It has the
look and feel of the rural American South. 39
Southern Delaware is part of the Delmarva Peninsula, a
region encompassing parts of Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia
and bordered by the Chesapeake Bay to the west and the Atlantic
Ocean to the east. 40 In a sense, its towns, counties, and people have
more in common with one another than with their respective
states. James Michener’s novel Chesapeake romanticizes the
region, which was largely disconnected from the mainland until
construction of the Chesapeake Bay Bridge in 1952. 41 Today, its
picturesque beaches, wetlands, farms, small towns with Victorian
homes, and unique cultures make it a popular tourist
destination. 42 However, the local agricultural economy
significantly restricts career options. Historically and now,
Delaware’s two southern counties, Kent and Sussex, have the

36. See
About
Wilmington,
THE
CITY
OF
WILMINGTON,
https://www.wilmingtonde.gov/about-us/about-the-city-of-wilmington
(last
visited Sept. 23, 2019) (describing the geography and history of Wilmington,
Delaware) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
37. See id. (noting that Wilmington is an economic, corporate, and
governmental hub for the region).
38. See generally John A. Munroe & Carol E. Hoffecker, Delaware,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA
(June
13,
2019),
https://www.britannica.com/place/Delaware-state/Health-and-welfare
(last
visited Sept. 1, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
39. Id.
40. See generally Delmarva Peninsula, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Nov. 29,
2011), https://www.britannica.com/place/Delmarva-Peninsula (last visited Sept.
1, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
41. See generally JAMES A. MICHENER, CHESAPEAKE (1978); OMARI SCOTT
SIMMONS, POTENTIAL ON THE PERIPHERY: COLLEGE ACCESS FROM THE BOTTOM UP
(2018). See also KLUGER, supra note 15, at 426–27 (describing Delaware’s
geographic and political climate).
42. See generally Southern Delaware, SOUTHERN DEL. TOURISM,
https://visitsoutherndelaware.com/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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highest poverty levels in the state—often higher than the national
average. 43
Although Delaware was a part of the Union during the Civil
War, it remained a slaveholding state during the war. 44 Its voters
registered a strongly pro-slavery preference in 1860, picking
Breckinridge for President over Abraham Lincoln. 45 Upstate
Delaware was dominated by the pre-eminent industrialist Henry
du Pont, whose company aligned with the Union politically and
economically, serving as a major supplier of explosives to the
military effort. 46 Delaware’s two southern counties (Kent and
Sussex), which comprise three-quarters of the state, were
slaveholding territory. 47 They also had enough votes to control the
state legislature. 48 Ironically, the first state to ratify the U.S.
Constitution refused to ratify the Reconstruction Amendments. 49
43. See CENTER FOR COMMUNITY RESEARCH & SERVICE, AN OVERVIEW OF
POVERTY IN DELAWARE 2 (2015) (showing that Kent and Sussex Counties have
higher poverty rates than New Castle County).
44. See Samuel B. Hoff, Opinion: Delaware’s Long Road to Ratification of the
13th
Amendment,
DEL.
ONLINE
(Dec.
7,
2015,
12:44
am),
https://www.delawareonline.com/story/opinion/contributors/2015/12/07/delaware
s-long-road-ratification-13th-amendment/76782210/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2019)
(chronicling Delaware history before and after the Emancipation Proclamation)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
45. See Meredith Hindley, The Man Who Came in Second, 31 HUMAN. 6, 20
(2010) (tracing the career trajectory of American politician John C. Breckinridge
to illuminate why his personal convictions regarding slavery lost him the 1860
presidential election); see also KLUGER, supra note 15, at 427 (illustrating
Delaware’s southern affinities).
46. See KLUGER, supra note 15, at 427 (calling du Pont “a strong Lincoln
man”).
47. See id. (observing “the further south one traveled in Delaware, the
deeper the allegiance to Dixie ways and attitudes one encountered”).
48. See Hoff, supra note 44 (discussing the General Assembly’s rejection of
emancipation).
49. See Hoff, supra note 44 (noting Delaware fought for the Union but
refused to ratify the Civil War amendments until 1901); see also Justin Wm.
Moyer, Delaware Apologizes for Slavery and Jim Crow. No Reparations
Forthcoming., WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2016/02/11/delaware-apologizes-for-slavery-and-jim-crowno-reparations-forthcoming/?utm_term=.e03b6ad708c4 (last visited Sept. 23,
2019) (describing how the “First State” did not formally apologize for slavery until
2016, after many other states had already done so) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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The state legislature declared its opposition to all “measures
intended or calculated to equalize or amalgamate the Negro race
with the white race, politically or socially . . . and to making
Negroes eligible to public offices, to sit on juries, and to their
admission to public schools where white children attend.” 50
After the Civil War, Quakers, Unitarians, and philanthropists
such as Julius Rosenwald, Booker T. Washington, and George
Peabody largely bypassed Delaware and concentrated their efforts,
particularly to advance black education, further south. 51 Blacks
were basically on their own, except for lumber given by the
short-lived Freedmen’s Bureau between 1866 and 1867 52 and some
modest private funding from philanthropic organizations. 53 There
was no regular state support for black schools until 1918. 54
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 55
Delaware amended its constitution in 1897 to require separate
schools for white and black children, 56 but the state lacked both
internal and external white financial support for black schools
50. KLUGER, supra note 15, at 427.
51. See Robert J. Taggart, Philanthropy and Black Public Education in
Delaware, 1918–1930, 103 PA. MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 467, 474 (1979)
(examining the impact of contributions from individual philanthropists like
Rosenwald on Delaware’s school system); see also KLUGER, supra note 15, at 431
(describing Quaker involvement in black education).
52. See Records of the Field Offices for the District of Columbia, Bureau of
Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 1865–1870, NAT’L MUSEUM OF AFR.
AM. HIST. & CULTURE, https://nmaahc.si.edu/object/sova_nmaahc.fb.m1902 (last
visited July 16, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The
Freedmen’s Bureau was established by Congress in 1865 to help former slaves
and poor whites in the south by providing lumber and assistance in the
construction of homes and schools in the Delmarva area. Id.
53. See Taggart, supra note 51, at 468 (mentioning that funding was
provided by short-lived organizations like the Delaware Association for the Moral
Improvement and Education of the Colored People, organized by whites in
Wilmington in 1866 to provide schools for black students).
54. See id. (emphasizing the limited support for black education in
Delaware).
55. 16 U.S. 537 (1896).
56. See Robert L. Hayman, Jr., A History of Race in Delaware: 1639–1950, in
CHOOSING EQUALITY: ESSAYS AND NARRATIVES ON THE DESEGREGATION EXPERIENCE
57–58 (Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Leland Ware eds., 2009) (discussing Article X of
the Delaware Constitution, which implemented Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate but
equal” mandate).
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until 1918. 57 While at that time educational opportunity for
Delaware youth of all races was scant, black students could attend
only two secondary schools: Howard High School in Wilmington
and Delaware State College in Dover. 58 The former was the only
school offering a college preparatory curriculum; the latter was
largely a grammar-level trade school. 59 Thus, to obtain a four-year,
academic, secondary school education, black students had to travel
to Wilmington in the northernmost part of the state. 60 This was an
impossible task for many black students. 61
Delaware did not have a genuine public school system until
1921, when a newly-passed education law required an
“equivalent,” albeit segregated, education for white and black
students. 62 Desperate black residents “had to rely on . . . meager
property taxes [for school funding that] were [wholly] segregated
by race.” 63
The success of the effort to establish modern schools in
Delaware was due in large part to the financial, philanthropic, and
political efforts of Pierre S. du Pont, Delaware’s premiere
industrialist. 64 A proponent of modern school buildings “as the key
to a skilled, moral, and responsible citizenry,” du Pont founded the
Delaware School Auxiliary Association (DSAA) to construct
schools. 65 He contributed a total of $10 million to improve
57. See Taggart, supra note 51, at 469 (speculating Delaware would have
received greater investment in black education from northern philanthropic
organizations following the Civil War had it joined the Confederacy).
58. See id. at 468 (indicating the two secondary institutions available to
black students in Delaware); see also Hayman, supra note 56, at 60 (describing
the underdeveloped school systems).
59. Taggart, supra note 51, at 468.
60. Id.
61. Id. See also Hayman, supra note 56, at 60 (noting that “high school
remained a rare privilege” for black Delawareans).
62. See Hayman, supra note 56, at 61 (scrutinizing Delaware’s 1921 public
school law).
63. Taggart, supra note 51, at 469. See also Hayman, supra note 56, at 60
(observing the state’s contribution to black education in 1890 amounted to “just
over one dollar per child per year,” and that by 1917 black families paid school
tax rates three times higher than those of white families and saw few results).
64. See Hayman, supra note 56, at 61 (highlighting du Pont’s efforts).
65. Taggart, supra note 51, at 470.
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education throughout the state, and to silence public objections, he
donated $2.6 million for the construction of segregated schools for
black students, at no taxpayer expense. 66 Du Pont “believed that
he had stolen one of the most pervasive arguments whites had
against using public monies for schools: that white money would
be used for black children.” 67 His approach was rather successful.
In essence, he built the entire black school system without state
support, establishing over eighty black schools. 68 As a negative
consequence, Delaware’s white citizens did not accept any
accountability or responsibility for improving black education. 69
Yet without du Pont’s intervention, black citizens would have been
unlikely to realize anything close to viable structures for decent
schooling. 70 Ironically, these segregated schools would become the
subject of the litigation in Belton v. Gebhart.
A major shortcoming of DSAA construction was the lack of
desire and a plan to construct black secondary schools. 71 This void
in educational opportunity became relevant in Belton v. Gebhart.
As late as 1950, no public black high school south of Wilmington
offered a college preparatory curriculum. 72
Higher education among blacks and whites in Delaware
similarly reflected a sobering pattern of inequity. In 1891,
following the passage of the second Morrill Act—federal legislation
to create land-grant colleges—Delaware chartered the State
College for Colored Students, which eventually became Delaware
State College. 73 Notably, the college did not offer a four-year degree
66. See Hayman, supra note 56, at 61 (describing du Pont’s many objectors,
including those who did not want white taxes funding black education).
67. Taggart, supra note 51, at 479.
68. See id. at 482 (“Du Pont’s efforts . . . increased the likelihood that a black
youth could become literate in a safe and sanitary school building, taught by a
reasonably prepared and paid teacher.”).
69. See id. (noting that even before 1930 du Pont was complaining to state
officials that the schools he had built for black students were not being properly
maintained).
70. See id. (“Despite the unfortunate consequences for long-term integration,
Du Pont’s contributions gave Delaware’s blacks hope for the future.”).
71. See id. at 477 (“[DSAA] trustees believed it impossible to build a system
of high schools for black pupils extending over the entire state.”).
72. See id. at 468.
73. See id. at 477 (identifying Delaware State as one of the original
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until 1932 and in 1950 was not nationally accredited. 74
Underfunding by the state was a continuing problem, despite
contributions from du Pont for new campus buildings. 75 Disparities
between Delaware State College and the University of Delaware
would become the subject of litigation in Parker v. University of
Delaware. 76
In 1919, du Pont resigned as president of the family business
and devoted much of his time to the cause of education, including
service on the State Board of Education. Prior to his
school-building efforts between 1919 and 1928, E. I. du Pont de
Nemours and Company was not associated with racial justice in
Delaware. In 1926, when the editor of The Afro-American
newspaper asked du Pont why he had funded these schools, he
replied:
If the Delaware experiment proves satisfactory, which I am sure
it will, it will be a great incentive to go ahead more quickly in
other States . . . . The progress of Delaware schools will bear
watching, for on their success must hang the fate of Negro
public school education in the United States for many years. 77

E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company influenced “Delaware
as no other private enterprise controlled any other state in the
Union.” 78 Nonetheless, in the 1950s, Delaware’s most liberal
upstate community of Wilmington still resembled “Topeka,
Kansas, but a bit worse” from a racial perspective. 79

Morrill-Nelson land grant black colleges).
74. See Hayman, supra note 56, at 62 (noting that although a large donation
from du Pont had allowed the school to offer a four-year degree, by 1948 it was
“so underfunded that it lost its accreditation”).
75. See Taggart, supra note 51, at 477–78 (describing du Pont’s contributions
to the school).
76. 75 A.2d 225 (Del. Ch. 1950). Parker noted that the educational
opportunities between the two schools were not equal. Id.
77. Letter from Pierre S. du Pont, Chairman, General Motors, to Carl
Murphy, Editor, The Afro-American (Mar. 1, 1926) (on file with the Hagley
Museum and Library, Wilmington, Delaware).
78. See KLUGER, supra note 15, at 429–30 (describing the extent to which du
Pont created Delaware’s corporation-friendly climate).
79. Id. at 429.
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B. Influential Delaware Lawyers Advancing Civil Rights: Louis L.
Redding and Chancellor Collins Seitz
Despite the strong corporate influence in Delaware, two
Delaware lawyers are most often credited with advancing the
cause of racial justice.
1. Louis L. Redding
Louis Lorenzo Redding, a prominent Delaware civil rights
attorney, represented the plaintiffs in Parker v. University of
Delaware and Belton v. Gebhart. 80 His father, Lewis Alfred
Redding, was born in rural Kent County, Delaware in 1869,
attended Howard University, and had a distinguished career as a
postal service mail carrier and clerk. 81 Notably, he was the
longtime secretary of the Wilmington branch of the NAACP. 82
Louis L. Redding was a product of Delaware’s segregated public
school system, graduating in 1919 from Howard High School, the
only college preparatory high school for African Americans at that
time. 83 He subsequently attended and graduated from Brown
University with honors in 1923 and attended Harvard Law School,
where he was the only African American in the 1928 graduating
class. 84 In 1929, he became the first African American admitted to

80. Redding also represented plaintiffs in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), another influential civil rights case.
81. See KLUGER, supra note 15, at 430–43 (reviewing Lewis Alfred Redding’s
career).
82. Id. at 430–31.
83. See id. (discussing Lewis Lorenzo Redding’s schooling and early career);
see also Delaware: Conflict in a Border State, in Separate Is Not Equal: Brown v.
Board of Education, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST. BEHRING CTR.
(2004), https://americanhistory.si.edu/brown/history/4-five/delaware-2.html (last
visited Sept. 23, 2019) (chronicling the pre-Brown state of education in
Wilmington) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
84. See Eric Pace, L.L. Redding, 96, Desegregation Lawyer, Dies, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 1998, at C19 (providing an obituary for Redding).
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the Delaware Bar. 85 He remained its only African American
member until 1956, nearly 27 years. 86
Serving black clients in Delaware during the 1950s won little
prestige. 87 The top legal talent was hired by corporate interests,
and white lawyers who represented black clients were known to
charge “extortionate” fees. 88 Redding, a man of integrity, did not
engage in such practices and used his superior training and energy
to represent black clients. Black Delawareans desperately needed
his services. 89 He fought tirelessly and basically alone to advance
their civil rights and liberties. 90
2. Chancellor Collins Seitz
Like Louis Redding, Collins Seitz was a Wilmington native.
Growing up in a Catholic household, he was a religious minority in
his community. 91 He attended the University of Delaware and the
University of Virginia Law School before embarking on a
distinguished legal career. 92 He was appointed Vice Chancellor of
the Delaware Court of Chancery in 1946 at age 31 and Chancellor
in 1951 at the age of 39. 93 His ascendancy at such an early age to
the country’s preeminent business court is a tribute to his legal

85. Id. See also Leonard L. Williams, Louis L. Redding, DEL. LAW., Summer
1998, at 10, 10 (summarizing Redding’s biography).
86. See Hayman, supra note 56, at 59–61 (providing details on Redding’s
life); Pace, supra note 84 (same); Williams, supra note 85 (same).
87. Hayman, supra note 56, at 59. See also Frank H. Hollis, My Memories of
Law Practice in Wilmington, Delaware, DEL. LAW., Summer 1998, at 22
(portraying the experience of black Delaware lawyers and clients).
88. See KLUGER, supra note 15, at 430–31 (describing Redding’s role in the
Delaware Bar).
89. Williams, supra note 85, at 10 (noting that at the time Redding began
practicing law in Delaware even the courtrooms were segregated).
90. See id. (explaining that Redding was not accepted into the Delaware
State Bar Association until twenty years after he began practicing law and
practiced his trade “to a large degree in isolation”).
91. Id.
92. See Wolfgang Saxon, Judge Collins Seitz Dies at 84; Refuted Segregation
in Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1998, at C27 (providing Seitz’s obituary).
93. Id.
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acumen. 94 During his twenty-year tenure, he rendered over 400
reported opinions and garnered national recognition as
“pre-eminent among the state judges of the nation as the
consummate arbiter of corporate law.” 95 Thereafter, he joined the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, eventually
becoming chief judge and serving with distinction until his
retirement. 96
A cursory look at Seitz’s background would not necessarily
demonstrate a strong commitment to civil rights or “conviction
that racial segregation violates our constitution,” 97 but a deeper
look suggests otherwise. Collins Seitz “grew up in a wholly
segregated world; he lived in a white neighborhood, went to
segregated schools, worked in segregated workplaces, and lived a
life without social relationships with black persons.” 98 According
to former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, E. Norman
Veasey:
To say that Collins Seitz’s background was economically
humble is an understatement. His father worked for the
DuPont Company in Wilmington until he became ill in the late
’20s and died in 1929 just as the Great Depression hit. There
were no benefits for his mother, the widow, and this was a harsh
and bitter fact which partly shaped his approach to life. He felt
the need to be sensitive to the underdog and often to revolt from
conformity. So he lived a life where the principle of righting
wrongs became a passion. 99

Seitz was also the first Catholic member of the Delaware state
judiciary and was likely influenced by the anti-Catholic prejudice
94. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Collins Jacques Seitz, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
1279, 1279 (1984) (mentioning that Judge Seitz “crowded brilliant achievements
in corporate law one upon another”).
95. KLUGER, supra note 15, at 432.
96. See William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of
Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW.
351, 353–54 (1992) (describing Seitz’s accomplishments as Vice Chancellor and
Chief Judge).
97. Virginia Seitz, Chancellor Seitz’s Perspective on Brown v. Board of
Education, DEL. LAW., Spring 2004, at 11, 11.
98. Id.
99. E. Norman Veasey, Collins Jacques Seitz, Paradigm of Principle,
Passion, Professionalism, and Persuasion, 40 VILL. L. REV. 559, 559 (1995).
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he encountered as a youth. 100 He had demonstrated a commitment
to racial justice long before Belton v. Gebhart.
a. Foreshadowing Belton: Parker v. University of Delaware
In 1950, then-Vice Chancellor Seitz decided a case involving
his undergraduate alma mater, the University of Delaware, that
would foreshadow his later decision in Belton v. Gebhart. The
state’s flagship university did not admit blacks until his 1950
decision in Parker v. University of Delaware. 101 The case was
initiated when thirty black students at Delaware State College
applied for admission to the University of Delaware and were
rejected in 1950. 102 Louis Redding of the NAACP represented the
plaintiffs along with a young Jack Greenberg, who had recently
joined Thurgood Marshall at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s
New York City office. 103 The Parker decision enjoined the
University of Delaware from excluding black applicants under the
separate-but-equal doctrine because Delaware State College and
the University of Delaware failed to meet Plessy v. Ferguson’s
equivalency requirements. 104 Prior to ordering the University of
Delaware to admit the black plaintiffs, Seitz personally visited the
white-serving University of Delaware and black-serving Delaware
State College and found the latter “grossly inferior.” 105 These visits
led to factual findings that vividly demonstrated opportunity
discrepancies in terms of physical facilities, curriculum, and other
crucial features. 106
100. See Seitz, supra note 97, at 12 (describing how Collins Seitz’s childhood
hardships shaped his attitude towards civil rights).
101. See Parker v. U. of Del., 75 A.2d 225, 234 (Del. Ch. 1950) (holding that
the university’s refusal to consider black plaintiffs’ applications violated the
Equal Protection Clause).
102. See id. at 226 (noting that blacks were not allowed to apply to the
University if another educational institution within the state offered the same
course of study); see also KLUGER, supra note 15, at 431–32 (discussing Parker).
103. See KLUGER, supra note 15, at 431–32 (discussing NACCP staffing).
104. See Parker, 75 A.2d at 230 (explaining “separate but equal”
requirements).
105. Id. at 231.
106. See id. at 230–33 (describing Delaware State College’s capital assets per
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With the Parker decision, Seitz became “the first state judge
by court order to desegregate a state-financed university at the
undergraduate level.” 107 He made this ruling in a contentious
climate and could have hampered his professional advancement. 108
Many members of the State Senate disapproved of the “Parker
decision but also of his many public statements which made known
with clarity and directness his insistent support of desegregation
movements.” 109 Years later, Seitz would call Parker “an easy case”
because “to compare the University of Delaware with Delaware
State College at that time was sort of ludicrous.” 110
b. Public Statements Critiquing Injustice
Long before Belton v. Gebhart, Collins Seitz had made public
statements, away from the bench, on contemporary moral issues,
such as racial justice. 111 NAACP Legal Defense Fund lawyers,
especially Louis Redding and Jack Greenberg, were aware of them.
In the 1940s, Seitz worked with others to persuade the Catholic
Church and Delaware society that “racial segregation and racial
injustice should be anathema to the Church and to any person of
faith and decency.” 112 He wrote for Catholic periodicals and
performed broadcast editorials on local radio that directly
confronted racial injustice. A March 5, 1947 editorial broadcast on
WDEL on behalf of the National Conference of Christians and
Jews captures Seitz’s commitment and clarity:
In connection with the Negro problem, can we of the white race
analyze the reasons for some of the conditions extant among the
Negroes without ourselves being seriously embarrassed? . . . To
capita, student-faculty ratio, and libraries as inferior to those of the University of
Delaware).
107. Brennan, Jr., supra note 94, at 1279.
108. See id. (explaining that Seitz made his ruling shortly before the State
Senate acted upon his nomination for Chancellor).
109. Id.
110. Edmund N. Carpenter II, A Conversation with Judge Collins J. Seitz, Sr.,
DEL. LAW., Fall 1998, at 24, 29 (discussing Parker).
111. See Seitz, supra note 97, at 12 (describing the anti-segregation editorials
and speeches Seitz made in the 1940s).
112. Id.
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those who have studied the problem with a real desire to see
that every individual in this country moves toward a realization
of the fruits which grow from practicing our theory of
democracy, the so-called Negro problem is the joint
responsibility of all citizens who practice democracy and live the
Ten Commandments. Lip service is not enough. 113

In a March 31, 1948 editorial broadcast on WILM, Seitz
unequivocally asserted his support for federal civil rights
legislation:
All too often we use the excuse that the time is not ripe to justify
ourselves for not taking some affirmative action requiring moral
courage. The President’s Committee [on Civil Rights] does not
and need not apologize for recommending the enactment of
specific legislation by the federal government for the protection
of the civil liberties of all of its citizens. Such legislation will be
tangible evidence to the oppressed that their government
can—within the democratic framework—make the words “civil
rights” a meaningful part of their daily lives—not just so many
empty words. 114

On June 4, 1951, Seitz’s Salesianum High School
commencement address directly critiqued the lack of moral clarity
exhibited by societal institutions:
Many of us would become fighting mad were we told that we did
not really believe in the great principles of the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution of the United States. Yet I
submit that too many of us talk out of both sides of our mouths
at the same time on this important subject. How can we say that
we deeply revere the principles of our Declaration and our
Constitution and yet refuse to recognize those principles when
they are to be applied to the American Negro in a down-to-earth
fashion? . . . A person has real moral courage when, being in a
position to make decisions or determine policies, he decides that
the qualified Negro will be admitted to a school of nursing; that
the Negro, like the white, will receive a fair trial no matter what
the public feeling may be; that every Catholic school, church and
institution shall be open to all Catholics—not at some distant

113.
114.

Id.
Id.
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future time when public opinion happens to coincide with
Catholic moral teaching—but now. 115

Seitz’s commencement address challenged his young listeners
to exhibit moral courage and acknowledge that the condition of
black America was the “most pressing domestic issue today in
Delaware, and in fact the United States generally.” 116 Calling
attention to Delaware’s racial injustice was courageous because
the State Senate was to act upon his nomination for promotion to
Chancellor within days. 117 At that time, “the Senate remained, as
it had historically been, in the grip of anti-black downstaters.” 118
Despite Seitz’s firm stance, the Senate approved his nomination. 119
These writings and speeches foreshadowing Belton leave little
doubt about Seitz’s position on racial segregation. For Chancellor
Seitz, “racial and religious bigotry are foreign to our theory of
democracy not only before the law but in our daily social and
economic contacts.” 120 According to Virginia Seitz, her father’s
perspective was also influenced by his legal training, as he
revealed in a 1965 address to new members of Phi Beta Kappa:
We humans do not seem to come by an objective attitude
naturally. For some psychological reason, once our mind has
made a judgment or an evaluation, it tends to shield itself from
ideas which unsettle it in such areas. Thus, true objectivity of
mind must be consciously cultivated by young and old alike. It
is a state of mind which welcomes new ideas or formulations. It
does not raise barriers of intellectual self-contentment or fear of
the unorthodox. 121

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
KLUGER, supra note 15, at 431.
See id. at 434 (describing Seitz’s confirmation to Chancellor).
Id. at 432.
Id. at 434.
Seitz, supra note 97, at 12.
Id. at 12–13.
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For Seitz, clear principled thinking and justice are often
byproducts of sound legal reasoning. 122 As he would later say,
“desegregation to me was easy.” 123
C. Belton v. Gebhart
Belton v. Gebhart was actually two, nearly-identical
cases—the other was Bulah v. Gebhart. 124 These two cases, which
illustrate the persistent educational inequities in Delaware, were
consolidated into the landmark Brown v. Board of Education
decision. 125 The NAACP brought these two separate Delaware
cases to test the legality of the state’s segregated public school
system. 126 Both plaintiffs brought suit because their African
American children had to attend inferior schools 127—Ethel Belton
in Claymont and Sarah Bulah in the town of Hockessin—but Sarah
Bulah’s situation was unique because she was a white woman with
an adopted black child. 128 Local attorney Louis Redding, who was
Delaware’s only African-American attorney at the time, argued
both cases in Delaware’s Court of Chancery with NAACP Legal
Defense Fund attorney Jack Greenberg. 129

122. See id. at 12 (“He fully embraced the rigor of legal reasoning and the
habits of mind that it engendered as pathways to the truth—more specifically the
true meaning of the law.”).
123. Carpenter, supra note 110, at 31.
124. 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch. 1952).
125. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 486 n.1 (1954)
(consolidating Belton v. Gebhart (Delaware), Brown v. Board of Education
(Kansas), Bolling v. Sharp (District of Columbia), Briggs v. Elliot (South
Carolina), and Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County (Virginia));
see also Hayman, supra note 56, at 3–4 (Brown consolidation); Dolores K. Sloviter,
Tribute to Collins J. Seitz: A Kind Man, 40 VILL. L. REV. 553, 553–54, 557 (1995)
(remembering Seitz for his Belton v. Gebhart decision, which played “a persuasive
role” in Brown v. Board of Education, and acknowledging his “enthusiasm for the
law and his patience with human beings and their frailties”).
126. See Belton, 87 A.2d at 863–64 (stating Belton and Bulah’s claims).
127. KLUGER, supra note 15, at 434–36.
128. See id. (describing the Bulahs’ adoption of their daughter Shirley and
their struggle to find her adequate schooling).
129. See Belton, 87 A.2d at 862 (naming attorneys).
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The cases were originally filed in U.S. District Court in
Wilmington but later transferred to the Court of Chancery.
Delaware’s Attorney General Hyman Albert Young asked that the
cases be heard in state court because state law was involved. 130
Trying these cases before the Court of Chancery and its recently
appointed Chancellor was a favorable venue for the NAACP, which
had previously argued successfully before Seitz in Parker v.
University of Delaware. 131 Moreover, the NAACP was well aware
of Seitz’s public statements and that his decision in Parker had
made him, according Louis Redding, “a lot of enemies.” 132 The
NAACP assembled a strong panel of expert witnesses that
included Frederic Wertham, a leading forensic psychiatrist, who,
in essence, testified that segregation had ill effects on both black
and white youth, creating a public health problem. 133
1. The Ruling
In Belton, Chancellor Seitz held that black schoolchildren
suffered from state-imposed segregation. 134 Although he had no
power to overrule the separate-but-equal doctrine established by
the United States Supreme Court fifty-eight years earlier in Plessy
v. Ferguson, he nonetheless found that the state was not providing
equal facilities. Chancellor Seitz made the following factual
finding:
I conclude from the testimony that in our Delaware society,
State-imposed segregation in education itself results in the
Negro children, as a class, receiving educational opportunities
130. See KLUGER, supra note 15, at 436–37 (describing jurisdictional
challenges).
131. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (describing the holding in
Parker).
132. See KLUGER, supra note 15, at 436–37.
133. See id. at 441–46 (discussing Wertham’s career and Parker testimony);
Belton, 87 A.2d at 864 (“State-imposed school segregation produces in Negro
children an unsolvable conflict which seriously interferes with the mental health
of such children.”).
134. See Belton, 87 A.2d at 864 (“[V]iewed against the social background of
the Delaware community, . . . the Negro child [feels] that he is inferior because,
in an indirect fashion, the State has said so.”).
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which are substantially inferior to those available to white
children otherwise similarly situated. . . . I believe the
“separate but equal” doctrine in education should be rejected,
but I also believe its rejection must come from [the Supreme]
Court. 135

Seitz’s opinion quoted and paraphrased the expert testimony of
Wertham, concluding that racial separation “creates a mental
health problem in many Negro children with a resulting
impediment in their educational progress.” 136 The opinion leaves
little doubt regarding his belief that segregation per se created
inequality. However, Chancellor Seitz acknowledged the legal
limits of his decision and suggested that the U.S. Supreme Court
re-examine the separate but equal doctrine:
I, therefore, conclude that while State-imposed segregation in
lower education provides Negroes with inferior educational
opportunities, such inferiority has not yet been recognized by
the United States Supreme Court as violating the Fourteenth
Amendment. On the contrary, it has been by implication
excluded as a Constitutional factor. It is for that Court to
re-examine its doctrine in the light of my finding of fact. It
follows that relief cannot be granted plaintiffs under their first
contention. 137

On appeal, Belton influenced the Brown Court’s ultimate
decision concerning the constitutionality of segregated schooling.
The following passage from U.S. Supreme Court’s Brown opinion
bears a striking resemblance to language found in the Court of
Chancery’s Belton opinion:
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
“separate but equal” has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the
plaintiffs and others similarly situated . . . are, by reason of the
segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 138

In Belton, Chancellor Seitz, although upholding the
separate-but-equal standard in Plessy v. Ferguson, ordered the
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 865.
Id. at 864.
Id. at 866.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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immediate desegregation of two public schools in 1952, and the
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed this ruling. 139 Seitz’s order was
eventually affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown. 140
Notably, Belton v. Gebhart was the only Brown case in which the
NAACP prevailed at the trial level. 141 The Delaware Court of
Chancery, known for its corporate prowess, made a major
contribution to the cause of American democracy.
2. The Remedy
Seitz used the broad, equitable powers of the Court of
Chancery when he “ordered the immediate admission of black
children to the white elementary and secondary schools that he
had found superior in quality.” 142 It “was the first time, after a
finding of inequality, that blacks were admitted at once to white
schools at the elementary and secondary levels.” 143 Seitz would
later reflect that he “found it inexcusable that the state would lend
its support to dividing its citizens this way.” 144 He rebuked the
defendant’s position that the state was not ready for desegregated
education:
Defendants say that the evidence shows that the State may not
be “ready” for non-segregated education, and that a social
problem cannot be solved with legal force. Assuming the
validity of the contention without for a minute conceding the
sweeping factual assumption, nevertheless, the contention does
not answer the fact that the Negro’s mental health and
therefore, his educational opportunities are adversely affected
by State-imposed segregation in education. The application of
Constitutional principles is often distasteful to some citizens,

139. See Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d. 137, 172 (Del. 1952) (affirming Seitz’s
order).
140. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (concluding that “[s]eparate educational
facilities are inherently unequal”).
141. See Seitz, supra note 97, at 13 (noting the groundbreaking nature of
Seitz’s ruling).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. KLUGER, supra note 15, at 448.
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but that is one reason for Constitutional guarantees. The
principles override transitory passions. 145

Seitz’s clear and fair remedy exhibited both legal and moral
clarity:
It seems to me that when a plaintiff shows to the satisfaction of
a court that there is an existing and continuing violation of the
“separate but equal” doctrine, he is entitled to have made
available to him the State facilities which have been shown to
be superior. To do otherwise is to say to such a plaintiff: “Yes,
your Constitutional rights are being invaded, but be patient, we
will see whether in time they are still being violated.” If, as the
Supreme Court has said, this right is personal, such a plaintiff
is entitled to relief immediately, in the only way it is available,
namely, by admission to the school with the superior facilities.
To postpone such relief is to deny relief, in whole or in part, and
to say that the protective provisions of the Constitution offer no
immediate protection. 146

As mentioned, this ruling was the first time a court had
ordered a segregated white public school in the United States to
admit black children. 147 Thurgood Marshall asserted: “This is the
first real victory in our campaign to destroy segregation of
American pupils in elementary and high schools.” 148 Chief Justice
William Rehnquist stated: “In the eyes of many, Chancellor Collins
Seitz’s 1952 decision in Belton v. Gebhart is the Court of
Chancery’s ‘proudest accomplishment.’” 149
Although the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Belton v. Gebhart
in Brown v. Board of Education, it took a different direction in
fashioning a remedy in Brown II. 150 After ordering additional
briefing and argument on the appropriate remedy for segregation,
it ultimately ordered only that desegregation take place “with all
deliberate speed” rather than immediately, deviating from the
approach taken in Belton. 151 Specifically, the Supreme Court
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Belton, 87 A.2d at 864–65.
Id. at 869–70.
See KLUGER, supra note 15, at 450–51 (evaluating Parker’s impact).
Id.
Rehnquist, supra note 96, at 353–54.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
Seitz, supra note 97, at 13.
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asserted the cases be “remanded to the District Courts to take such
proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this
opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on
a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the
parties to these cases.” 152 This controversial and ambiguous
language “was used as a device to maintain the [racial] status
quo.” 153 Ultimately, it set back desegregation progress for over a
decade. 154 Ten years after the Brown decision, only 1.2% of black
students attended schools with whites. 155 In five states (Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina), no black
students attended white schools. 156 In Griffin v. County School
Board of Prince Edward County, 157 Justice Hugo Black concluded
that “[t]here has been entirely too much deliberation and not
enough speed in enforcing constitutional rights which we held in
Brown v. Board of Education.” 158 Many southern states did not
make serious efforts to desegregate until the 1970s. 159 Brown II
also stalled desegregation in Delaware school districts where
resistance was massive. 160
III. Shareholder Activism: Past and Present
A. The Past: Corporate Reticence and Separatism
During the Civil Rights Era, “corporations played the roles of
passive supporting character, active protagonist, and defiant
antagonist.” 161 Passive support reflected acquiescence to Jim Crow
152. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
153. Seitz, supra note 97, at 13.
154. See Ware, supra note 12, at 28 (describing white southerners’ campaign
of “massive resistance” against desegregation).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
158. See id. at 229 (involving a school board from the original Brown cases
which closed all of its schools to avoid desegregation).
159. See Ware, supra note 12, at 30 (describing delay tactics by southern
states).
160. See id. (lingering impact of resistance to desegregation in Delaware).
161. Tom C.W. Lin, Incorporating Social Activism, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1535, 1539
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and segregationist forces. 162 Active companies supported civil
rights through financial assistance to advocacy organizations such
as the NAACP, as well as sua sponte desegregation by rejecting
tradition and accepting African American employees and
customers. 163 Defiant antagonism opposed social activism, actively
worked against certain groups and causes, and rejected or
circumvented civil rights legislation and court rulings. 164
For the first half of the twentieth century, most major
corporations passively acquiesced to Jim Crow segregation,
avoiding direct engagement with major political and social
issues. 165 However, corporate managers with philanthropic
interests in black education worked outside of the corporate
context
in
a
way
that
resembles
modern-day
166
“philanthrocapitalism.” These managers may have believed that
(2018); see also Joseph Luders, The Economics of Movement Success: Business
Responses to Civil Rights Mobilization, 111 AM. J. SOC. 963, 965–70 (2006)
(examining shifting relationships between business interests and civil rights
activists and highlighting role of disruption costs in social movements);
Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Radical Repertoires: The Incidence and Impact of
Corporate-Sponsored Social Activism, 27 ORG. SCI. 53, 55 (2016) (arguing that
“overt corporate-sponsored activism is inherently riskier than evasive,
diversionary, or covert tactics”); MARK PRENDERGRAST, FOR GOD, COUNTRY AND
COCA-COLA: THE UNAUTHORIZED HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S MOST POPULAR SOFT
DRINK 280–87 (2000) (scrutinizing Coca-Cola’s evolving positions on
desegregation during the Civil Rights Era).
162. See Lin, supra note 161, at 1541 (describing how many businesses
“served as passive characters reluctantly thrust into the history books” during
the civil rights movement).
163. See id. at 1542 (describing large corporations and smaller black-owned
businesses that spearheaded integration efforts).
164. See id. at 1542–43 (businesses undermining integration).
165. See id. at 1541 (“Rather than explicitly support or oppose the Civil Rights
Movement, . . . many businesses of the time . . . simply decided to passively
uphold the misguided, inhumane ways of the Jim Crow South.”).
166. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS
1954–1963 32–33, 395 (1989) (highlighting the role corporations played in the
Civil Rights Act’s passage); CLAY RISEN, THE BILL OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC
BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 63–73, 247 (2014) (considering Southern
businesses’ role in demanding an end to the Jim Crow Era). For a discussion of
philanthrocapitalism, see Aaron K. Chatterji & Barak D. Richman,
Understanding the “Corporate” in Corporate Social Responsibility, 2 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 33, 34 (2008) (discussing corporate decisionmaking in advancing
progressive
causes);
Janie
A.
Chuang,
Giving
as
Governance?
Philanthrocapitalism and Modern-Day Slavery Abolitionism, 62 UCLA L. REV.
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taking unpopular public positions would alienate customers
impacting the bottom line. For example, Julius Rosenwald,
longtime president of Sears & Roebuck Company, engaged in
significant philanthropic efforts to promote the cause of black
education in the first half of the twentieth century in the South. 167
But his efforts remained largely unknown to Sears customers and
the public at large. 168 His name was never prominently featured in
the famed Sears catalog during his tenure as president, and
although he and Aaron Nusbaum acquired a significant stake in
the company, they retained the Sears & Roebuck name. 169 This
name remained intact long after Rosenwald and Sears bought out
Nusbaum in 1903 and Sears’ retirement from the company in
1908. 170 Some observers speculate that Rosenwald’s reluctance to
become a more public face at Sears was a response to the
anti-Semitism potentially harbored by the company’s midwestern
farmer customer base. 171 Irrespective of the reasons, corporations
favored passivity and separatism, and this stance greeted
shareholder activist demands regarding civil rights in the first half
of the twentieth century. 172
1516, 1518 (2015) (exploring the rise of philanthrocapitalism in addressing
antitrafficking policymaking).
167. See PETER M. ASCOLI, JULIUS ROSENWALD: THE MAN WHO BUILT SEARS,
ROEBUCK AND ADVANCED THE CAUSE OF BLACK EDUCATION IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH
93–96 (2006) (memorializing Rosenwald’s philanthropic efforts, including the
construction of 5,300 “Rosenwald schools” for black children in the rural South).
See generally STEPHANIE DEUSTCH, YOU NEED A SCHOOLHOUSE: BOOKER T.
WASHINGTON, JULIUS ROSENWALD, AND THE BUILDING OF SCHOOLS FOR THE
SEGREGATED SOUTH (2011) (chronicling Rosenwald’s partnership with
Washington in the era preceding the civil rights movement).
168. See ASCOLI, supra note 167, at 74–75 (speculating that few Sears
customers knew much about Rosenwald).
169. See id. at 74 (observing that Rosenwald’s name did not appear on the
Sears catalog from 1909 to 1924).
170. See id. (“[Rosenwald] wisely realized that to tamper with the name of the
company . . . would be a serious marketing mistake.”).
171. See id. (explaining that while Rosenwald’s name and Jewish identity was
frequently mentioned in news stories, Rosenwald may have believed that his
rural customers would not see those publications).
172. See id. at 74–84 (describing Rosenwald’s extensive philanthropy
campaign and how it was carried out separately from the Sears, Roebuck brand);
see also Lisa M. Fairfax, From Apathy to Activism: The Emergence, Impact, and
Future of Shareholder Activism as the New Corporate Governance Norm, 99 B.U.

1288

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1259 (2019)

B. Modern Times: The Rise of Institutional Shareholders
and Activism
Since the Civil Rights Era of the 1950s and 1960s, domination
of the equity ownership landscape has been transferred from
diffuse, rationally apathetic individual investors to institutional
investors, who have greater capacity to influence civil rights. 173
The big question is willingness.
Today, in wealthy capitalist societies, “[t]he public corporation
is usurping the state’s role as [perhaps] the most important
institution in wealthy capitalist societies” through which “the vast
majority of economic activity is organized.” 174 This emergence has
coincided with a greater role in social activism. New information
technology and social media amplify activist demands and engage
businesses whether they like it or not. 175 Now more people expect
businesses and executives, particularly at public companies, to
engage with critical social issues, and corporate executives are
more exposed to public view. 176 A range of external threats,
L. REV. 1301, 1311 (2019) (“Directors and officers clearly viewed shareholder
apathy as preferable to shareholder activism or influence.”).
173. See Davis, supra note 18, at 1105 (tracing how institutional investors
have come to dominate the market); see also Fairfax, supra note 172, at 1314
(“[I]ndividual shareholders . . . have continued to be apathetic even as
institutional shareholder activism has increased significantly.”).
174. Gabriel Rauterberg, The Corporation’s Place in Society, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 913, 913 (2016); see also C. A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social
Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 77, 139 (2002) (“Corporations remain today, as they were in the
1920s, the most powerful nongovernmental institutions in America. In
innumerable ways they shape the nation’s politics and culture, and the lives of
their employees and consumers.”).
175. See Lin, supra note 161, at 1545–46 (recognizing social media’s power to
affect companies’ branding and stock prices while noting that “a bad viral video
or negative trending hashtag” may also draw the attention of regulators).
176. See id. at 1546
The days of simply ignoring social issues or writing a check are gone
for many large businesses. Corporations are now frequently expected
to engage in social issues through public statements, sponsorships,
partnerships, and policies supporting a position or a cause.
Increasingly, businesses are expected by their communities,
consumers, employees, and executives to engage in social activism on
issues directly or indirectly related to their core operations.
(footnotes omitted).
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including political intervention and public opinion, conspire to
influence corporate actions. 177
1. Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Factors
In socially responsible or impact investing, environmental,
social, and governance (ESG) factors guide decisionmaking. ESG
concerns, such as human rights and climate change, have a
non-shareholder constituency character, but, as a practical matter,
they are not divorced from traditional corporate metrics and
shareholder value because these criteria may also have financial
relevance. 178 Although initially resisted by investors, ESG
investment is estimated at twenty trillion dollars in assets under
management (AUM), or one-quarter of all AUM worldwide. 179
Forbes Magazine describes the growing importance of ESG:
In 2018, thousands of professionals from around the world hold
the job title “ESG Analyst” and ESG investing is the subject of
news articles in the financial pages of the world’s leading
newspapers. Many investors recognize that ESG information
about corporations is vital to understand corporate purpose,

177. See DAVID VOGEL, LOBBYING THE CORPORATION: CITIZEN CHALLENGES TO
BUSINESS AUTHORITY 225–26 (1978) (describing the combined impact of public
opinion and government action).
There is a way in which corporations can be forced to make decisions
not dominated by the logic of capital accumulation, but it cannot be
achieved through “corporate accountability.” It requires the direct
intervention of the government. At best, corporate activists can
supplement government regulation; what they cannot do is substitute
for it. . . . The corporate challenge movement has not and, indeed,
cannot adequately address these fundamental issues because they can
only be addressed through the governmental process.
Id.
178. See George Krell, The Remarkable Rise of ESG, FORBES (July 11, 2018,
10:09 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/2018/07/11/the-remarkablerise-of-esg/#40d82d851695 (last visited July 16, 2019) (noting corporate response
to ESG factors like climate change, water conservation, worker protection, and
supply chain management have direct financial relevance) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
179. Id.
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strategy and management quality of companies. It is now, quite
literally, big business. 180

The new wave of corporate social activism is influenced by
three forces: convergence of the public-private spheres, evolution
of corporate social responsibility efforts, and expansion of
corporate political rights. 181 An array of mechanisms is used to
lobby corporations: impact investors, social impact ratings,
regulators, customers, social media, and public demands. 182 In this
climate, corporations are also choosing direct action. They are
assessing their own ESG profiles and considering risks alongside
other traditional performance metrics. Savvy corporate managers
exercising their responsibilities must consider how ESG factors fit
into business strategy and respond to pleas from impact investors
and the public to engage with them. 183 They can communicate
through annual reports, proxy statements, ESG-based reports, and
branding campaigns. Ignoring ESG could lead to negative business
outcomes in the current environment.
Critics contend ESG factors are too ambiguous or
insubstantial and camouflage empty corporate promises, cosmetic
actions, and routine disclosures. 184 However, state corporate law
180. Id.
181. See Lin, supra note 161, at 1558 (analyzing the roots of new corporate
social activism).
182. See id. at 1544 (“[N]ew social media and financial technologies have
dramatically changed the means and ends of corporate social activism in ways
previously unimaginable.”).
183. See J. P. Dallmann, Impact Investing, Just a Trend or the Best Strategy
to Help Save Our World?, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2018, 7:49 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jpdallmann/2018/12/31/impact-investing-just-atrend-or-the-best-strategy-to-help-save-our-world/#e670c1875d11 (last visited
July 5, 2019) (“[I]mpact investors are far more proactive in their intention for
positive impact as opposed to merely avoiding the negative impacts.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
184. See, e.g., ESG Beyond Greenwashing, CITYWIRE (Sept. 6, 2018),
https://citywire.co.uk/wealth-manager/news/esg-beyond-greenwashing/a1152166
(last visited July 16, 2019) (“Today greenwashing [falsely touting a company’s
products or policies as environmentally-friendly] has become more sophisticated,
aided by the lack of a universal definition over what constitutes good corporate
behavior and consequently, what are eligible investments. This ambiguity plays
into the hands of companies purporting to exhibit ESG-friendly practices.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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remains steadfast in terms of its own priorities. The Honorable Leo
E. Strine, Jr. makes clear that:
[d]espite attempts to muddy the doctrinal waters, a clear-eyed
look at the law of corporations in Delaware reveals that, within
the limits of their discretion, directors must make stockholder
welfare their sole end, and that other interests may be taken
into consideration only as a means of promoting stockholder
welfare. 185

Decisions pertaining to ESG do not differ much from other
decisions subject to the business judgment rule, 186 provided some
impact on, or link to, shareholder value is identifiable. Such
decisions “might include how corporations respond to climate
change, how good they are with water management, implementing
effective health and safety policies to protect against accidents,
managing supply chains, [and] how they treat their workers.” 187

185. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the
Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 768 (2015).
States have created social enterprises such as public benefit corporations to better
address stakeholder concerns. See, e.g., Omari Scott Simmons, Judging the Public
Benefit Corporation, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW
354 (Benjamin Means & Joseph W. Yockey eds., 2018).
186. Robert Clark describes the business judgment rule as the principle that
“the business judgment of the directors will not be challenged or overturned by
courts or shareholders, and the directors will not be held liable for the
consequences of their exercise of business judgment—even for judgments that
appear to have been clear mistakes—unless certain exceptions apply.” ROBERT
CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4, at 124 (1986); see also FRANKLIN A.
GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 278–79 (2000) (“The idea underlying the rule is that
courts should exercise restraint in holding directors liable for . . . business
decisions which produce poor results or with which reasonable minds might
disagree. This seems to be a sensible notion. After all, business decisions typically
involve taking calculated risks.”).
187. Krell, supra note 178. See also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate
Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005) (arguing corporate
social responsibility initiatives are permitted pursuant to the broad discretion
under Delaware law); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), overruled by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (analyzing the business judgment
rule’s protections).
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2. Corporate Power and Accountability

In their seminal book The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means “addressed two
dimensions of corporate power: (i) the internal minimization of
agency costs resulting from the separation of ownership and
control between diffuse shareholders and executives; and (ii) the
external abuse of corporate power at the expense of society
at-large.” 188 The first dimension has dominated the corporate
governance debate in the United States, whereas the latter has
received less acceptance from U.S. scholars. 189 It reflects a populist
uneasiness with concentrations of corporate power coupled with a
lack of accountability for negative externalities and broader
stakeholder concerns. 190 Overall, accountability remains the
188. Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of
Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 333 n.199 (2009); see also
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 11–13, 17–18 (1932) (examining the consequences of
separation of corporate ownership and control).
189. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439–41 (2001) (asserting the most prominent
global corporate governance paradigm is shareholder wealth maximization). But
see FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 680 (defining “stakeholder” as any group of
individuals impacted by corporate actions, regardless of whether such group
desires corporate profit maximization); Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as
Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of
the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1274 (1999) (asserting corporate
decisions often implicate non-shareholder concerns); Cynthia A. Williams,
Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 705, 716 (2002)
The progressive alternative, which is derived from the stakeholder
theory of the corporation, suggests that corporate managers’
underlying social obligations are more extensive than maximizing
shareholders’ wealth within the confines of the law. Specifically,
progressive scholars contend that directors . . . ought to consider the
implications of their actions on employees, consumers, suppliers (in
some cases), the community, and the environment.
190. See Simmons, supra note 188, at 333. Historically, the scholarly
discussion of the role of the corporation in society can be traced to the
Berle–Dodd debate of the 1930s. See generally BERLE, supra note 188, at 11–13,
17–18; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); see also Wells, supra note 174, at 78 (“Legal debates
over corporate social responsibility stretch from the 1930s to the twenty-first
century.”).
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threshold issue in corporate governance, encompassing both
internal and external dimensions. 191
“For Adolf Berle, checks on a corporation’s economic power
include[d] competition, profits, political intervention, and public
consensus or sentiment.” 192 He observed:
[A] modern American corporation understands well enough that
it
has
a
“constituency”
to
deal
with.
If
its
constituents—notably its buyers—are unsatisfied, they will go
to the political state for solution. Hardly any present-day board
of directors or corporation management would take the position
that it could afford to disregard public opinion—or would last
very long if it did. 193

He further notes that “[t]he corporation is now, essentially, a
nonstatist political institution, and its directors are in the same
boat with public office-holders. If ever corporate managers base
their continued tenure on power and not on reason, the end is
disaster.” 194 His characterization of corporate power as the
primary issue in corporate governance raises questions concerning
who is and who should be a corporation’s targeted audience.
“Adolph Berle and other commentators described the modern
corporation
as
a
major
social
institution
rivaling
government[s].” 195 Without question, it “touches virtually every
aspect of contemporary life,” yet it does not necessarily reflect the
accountability and democratic procedures that most citizens expect
191.
192.

See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
Simmons, supra note 188, at 330; see also ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH
CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 39, 54, 58 (1954) (arguing that public opinion is
a check on the power of corporations).
193. See BERLE, supra note 192, at 56–57 (arguing that public opinion is a
check on the power of corporations).
194. Id. at 60.
195. Simmons, supra note 188, at 337 n.224; see also Norton E. Long, The
Corporation, Its Satellites, and the Local Community, in THE CORPORATION IN
MODERN SOCIETY 202, 202 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959)
The large corporation takes its place along with the church and the
armed services as an organization that transcends the local territory
and cuts across political boundaries, at times even those of the nation
and state. For some of the members at least, the corporation represents
a value-laden institution that outranks the local community as a focus
of loyalty and a medium for self-realization.
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from government. 196 In light of its complexity, modern corporate
study should not be limited to legal analysis, but rather embrace
the social sciences—politics, economics, history, sociology—to
capture the full scope of its impact. 197
Modern society is witnessing a public-private convergence
blurring traditional lines and spheres of influence between the
private sector and government. 198 As these lines collapse, activists
seek influence beyond avenues of government and public policy to
include business and corporate policy. 199 Despite growing citizen
demands for public accountability, commentators argue this
perspective is problematic:
The notion of the corporation as a public institution or private
government is both informative and misleading. It is
informative in that it illuminates the extent to which the social
impact of the corporation does resemble that of a government.
But it is deceptive to the extent that it obscures the inability of
the corporation to command compliance with its decisions. The
reason that a corporation, unlike a democratically elected
government, cannot be politically accountable to those affected
by its decisions, is because the most important decisions made

196. Simmons, supra note 188, at 337. Berle’s observations were not unique:
The corporate accountability movement represents an attempt to
realize in practice what scholars such as Latham, Dahl, and others
have argued in theory—namely that corporations wield the power of
governments and should, therefore, be treated like governments. The
movement is accurately described as a movement for corporate
accountability because its basic thrust is to make corporate officials as
responsive to those affected by their decisions as are elected officials.
By reviving the symbols and mechanisms of corporate
governance—the annual meeting, the annual report, the proxy
resolutions, the board of directors—the advocates of corporate
accountability are attempting to make the relationship between the
officials of the private sector and the public resemble more closely that
between government officials and their constituencies.
VOGEL, supra note 177, at 6–7 (1978).
197. Simmons, supra note 188, at 337 n.226. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Foreword,
in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 195, at ix, ix–xi.
198. See Lin, supra note 161, at 1558–59 (considering the corporate adoption
of government objectives once believed to be beyond the reach of markets).
199. See id. at 1561 (arguing that activists will seek to change not only laws
and public policies, but also “institutional practices and priorities at major
corporations”).
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by any firm are out of the control of those who govern it; they
are dictated by the imperatives of a market economy. 200

Another observer elaborates on the public-private distinction:
Shareholders frequently choose to be part of a corporation;
many citizens do not choose to be part of a country.
Shareholders in a corporate democracy that disagree with the
corporation’s actions and values can readily sell their shares;
citizens of a democratic society cannot readily leave their
countries without incurring significant costs. Given the
differences between political democracies and corporate
democracies, democratic moral values should not be supplanted
by corporate market values. 201

Despite blurred lines between the public and private spheres,
certain distinctions remain and should be considered when
assessing the efficacy of shareholder activism in advancing civil
rights. Ideally, the public, private, and nonprofit sectors operate in
a mutually reinforcing state of symbiosis rather than antagonism.
C. Efficacy of Shareholder and Corporate Activism Versus Other
Democratic Mechanisms in Protecting Minority Rights
The enthusiastic embrace of shareholder activism as a tool to
bring about broad social change is a welcome development. It
reflects a trend of outsourcing public functions and values to
private actors 202 and stems in part from a frustration with interest
group politics and existing democratic processes in the public
context. 203 However, overreliance on shareholder activism and
similar private tactics may lead to an expectations gap; they are
not an effective surrogate for persistent, organized, mobilized
200. VOGEL, supra note 177, at 225.
201. Lin, supra note 161, at 1592.
202. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Governmental Regulation, 53 DUKE
L.J. 389, 434 (2003) (presenting instances where government regulators have
outsourced the implementation of regulatory policy and the provision of public
services).
203. See Douglas G. Smith, A Comparative Analysis of the Proxy Machinery
in Germany, Japan, and the United States: Implications for the Political Theory
of American Corporate Finance, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 145, 224 (1996) (asserting that
interest group politics are a primary force shaping United States proxy rules).

1296

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1259 (2019)

social movements that employ diverse tactics in traditional
democratic venues. 204 Lessons from the civil rights movement
suggest broader systemic change will require sustained, combined
pressure from other institutional, social, and public actors.
Shareholder activist attempts by Bayard Rustin and James Peck
to change Greyhound’s segregative practices were not
successful. 205 Court victories that gave plaintiffs a legal hook
reflect how democratic institutions—judicial, legislative,
executive—may broadly signal social change and inspire greater
activism. 206
1. Modern ESG Activism Compared to Past Civil Rights
Movement Activism
What does civil rights activism look like in the modern era?
How does the earlier Civil Rights Era compare with today’s ESG
landscape? While civil rights fall under the umbrella of human
rights, today’s ESG landscape is much more expansive, extending
to economic rights, 207 voting rights, housing, 208 jobs, and
healthcare 209 and encompassing discrimination based on gender,
sexual orientation, disabilities, and immigration status. 210
204. See Lin, supra note 161, at 1540–44 (explaining how, despite some
shareholder activism successes, corporations often tend to passively ignore or
actively oppose the goals of social activism).
205. See supra Part I (describing Peck’s efforts); Marens, supra note 4, at 382
(describing Peck’s unsuccessful push to desegregate Greyhound).
206. See supra Part II (employing Belton as an example of activism by an
institutional actor, namely the Delaware Court of Chancery).
207. See Kate Sablosky Elengold, Consumer Remedies for Civil Rights, 99
B.U. L. REV. 587, 640 (2019) (advocating economic consumer protection as a tool
for civil rights).
208. See Richard A. Epstein, Property as a Fundamental Civil Right, 29 CAL.
W. L. REV. 187, 207 (1992) (endorsing housing as a civil right).
209. See David Barton Smith, Healthcare’s Hidden Civil Rights Legacy, 48 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 37, 60 (2003) (examining the desegregation of healthcare facilities
during the Civil Rights Era).
210. See generally KING IN THE WILDERNESS (HBO 2018) (chronicling the last
years of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s life, from his role in the Voting Rights Act of
1965 to his assassination in 1968). A strong argument can also be made that the
aims of the civil rights movement and the later Black Power movement were not
limited to traditional civil rights such as voting and participation, but extended
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Shareholder activism is largely a top-down, indirect approach,
whereas Civil Rights Era activism reflected bottom-up tactics with
persistent demands and protests to effectuate change throughout
society. 211 Tactics included litigation, 212 education, 213 direct
shareholder
activism, 215
protest,
civil
disobedience, 214
216
self-defense, and other spontaneous and planned individual and
group initiatives. 217 Activists executed a multipronged attack on
all aspects of segregation in every aspect of life: public
accommodations, education, housing, and employment. 218 Civil
rights advocacy organizations like the Congress of Racial Equality
(CORE), Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC),
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and the
NAACP LDF developed ambitious long-term strategies,
to economic rights. Id.
211. See generally MORRIS, supra note 10 (challenging the assumption that
the civil rights movement was driven by national leadership as opposed to
grassroots efforts).
212. See, e.g., supra Part II.C (highlighting the litigation surrounding Brown
v. Board of Education); Brent E. Simmons, Charles Hamilton Houston, 69 NAT’L
LAW. GUILD REV. 178, 181–83 (2012) (canvasing the career of civil rights lawyer
Charles Hamilton Houston, whose desegregation cases successfully established
binding national precedent).
213. See generally MORRIS, supra note 10 (discussing civil rights leaders’
efforts to promote quality African American education to produce a generation of
strong African American leaders).
214. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King’s Constitution: A Legal
History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999, 1002 n.27 (1989)
(discussing King’s civil disobedience); Interview with James Peck, supra note 5.
215. See supra notes 4–16 and accompanying text (examining Peck’s “Proxy
Campaign”).
216. See generally CHARLES E. COBB, JR., THIS NONVIOLENT STUFF’LL GET YOU
KILLED: HOW GUNS MADE THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT POSSIBLE (2014)
(describing the role that armed self-defense played in the survival and liberation
of black communities).
217. See generally MORRIS, supra note 10 (arguing the activities of “local
movement centers” were responsible for the rapid emergence of sustained civil
rights victories in southern communities during the Civil Rights Era); Stephen
Zunes & Jesse Laird, The U.S. Civil Rights Movement (1942–1968), INT’L CTR. ON
NONVIOLENT
CONFLICT
(2010),
https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/The-US-Civil-Rights-Movement-1942-1968.pdf
(describing how Civil Rights leaders purposefully used mass media, poetry, visual
arts, and music to promote social change).
218. See generally Zunes & Laird, supra note 217.
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coordinated efforts, and amplified the demands of marginalized
minority groups. 219 Such strategies and tactics have served as
blueprints for advancing other movements. 220 By contrast, the
question remains whether impact-investor activism and the ESG
emphasis will engender an enduring commitment to civil rights
and inspire significant ground-level and broader public changes
beyond the corporations themselves.
Another important question concerns who has the
responsibility to ensure whether corporations implement social
aims internally and externally. Who assesses the quality and
effectiveness of execution? Who follows up over time? Should these
tasks rest with the corporations themselves via private ordering,
or is more robust outside oversight needed to achieve ESG aims?
The systemic societal impacts of shareholder ESG activism are
uncertain because the ESG framework operates largely within a
paradigm that relies on the private market to right public
wrongs. 221 It tilts largely toward private autonomy versus public
accountability. Some critics might argue that overemphasizing
shareholder activism, within this context, actually weakens
demands for government solutions and limits government
accountability for correcting major social problems like civil rights
injustices. 222 At the extreme, it may decrease public spending on
services and divert resources from vulnerable groups. 223
219. See supra notes 4–16 and accompanying text (articulating the NAACP
LDF’s litigation strategy); see also CATSAM, supra note 5, at 13–46 (describing
CORE and SNCC’s role in organizing the Freedom Rides).
220. See, e.g., PAUL LE BLANC & MICHAEL D. YATES, A FREEDOM BUDGET FOR
ALL AMERICANS: RECAPTURING THE PROMISE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE
STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE TODAY (2013) (interpreting Martin Luther King,
Jr.’s “Freedom Budget”—a proposal to provide jobs and basic welfare to all
Americans—as an economic blueprint for the modern labor movement); Odeana
R. Neal, The Limits of Legal Discourse: Learning from the Civil Rights Movement
in the Quest for Gay and Lesbian Civil Rights, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 679, 718
(1996) (adopting civil rights movement strategies in the fight for LGBTQ rights).
221. See supra Part III.B.1 and accompanying text (analyzing the modern
ESG framework).
222. See generally Chatterji & Richman, supra note 166 (warning against
progressive overreliance on corporate social responsibility efforts to achieve
agendas).
223. See Michele Giddens, Demographic Trends are Driving Demand for
Impact Investment—And the Industry is Starting to Adapt, FORBES (July 5, 2018,
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Shareholder activism as a form of civil rights advocacy is perhaps
a symptom of an illness—declining state support, political
gridlock, and voter disenfranchisement. In an environment of
deregulation, privatization, and political gridlock, people may look
toward corporations for quicker answers and greater agency. 224
Recognizing the influence of corporations, shareholder demands
are a pragmatic strategy, yet without other approaches they will
have limited systemic impact on such meta-problems as civil
rights. 225
2. Ownership and Representativeness
Roughly fifty percent of U.S. citizens do not own a single share
in a company, directly or indirectly. 226 Equity ownership may not
reflect preferences of non-equity holders and the public. Activist
investors, largely composed of labor unions, mutual funds,
individuals, pension funds, and hedge funds (in which pension
funds are often invested) may reflect more affluent and elite
preferences. 227 Further, one scholar suggests that “because the
7:49 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michelegiddens/2018/07/05/demographictrends-are-driving-demand-for-impact-investment-and-the-industry-is-startingto-adapt/#163144434264 (last visited July 16, 2019) (“[T]o truly democratize
impact investing, we need to make it more accessible to ordinary savers.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
224. See Lin, supra note 161, at 1559 (“[C]ontemporary political gridlock and
obstructionist partisanship have made these corporate channels of social change
more appealing relative to the traditional public channels of government.”).
225. See id. at 1562 (emphasizing the importance of promoting social change
through both public government and private business channels).
226. See Christopher Ingraham, For Roughly Half of Americans, the Stock
Market’s Record Highs Don’t Help at All, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/12/18/for-roughly-half-ofamericans-the-stock-markets-record-highs-dont-help-at-all (last visited July 6,
2019) (reporting fewer than half of American households indirectly own stock via
retirement accounts and similar vehicles, while “[f]ewer than 14 percent of
American households directly own stock in any company”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
227. See Yuliya Ponomareva, Shareholder Activism Is on the Rise: Caution
Required, FORBES (Dec. 10, 2018, 12:27 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
esade/2018/12/10/shareholder-activism-is-on-the-rise-caution-required/
(last
visited July 16, 2019) (defining shareholder activism and describing various types
of shareholder activists) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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distribution of popular ownership of corporations over-represents
wealthier and higher income households, decisions made through
shareholder voting may be less reflective of social welfare than
decisions made through more broadly democratic bodies, and
therefore likely to be only a second-best solution.” 228 Many
institutional investors engage in tepid to moderate social activism.
The impact investor community is smaller and ostensibly acts as a
proxy for broader interests, 229 but its composition is
overwhelmingly homogenous from a race and class perspective. 230
The lack of representativeness and diversity inevitably creates
blind-spots. 231 Planning for vulnerable groups is not the same as
planning with them.
3. Majoritarian Politics Disfavors Vulnerable Minorities
Context matters, and the status of majoritarian politics can
influence the success of shareholder activism in the civil rights
arena. In theory, highly polarized majoritarian politics that
overwhelmingly disfavor minority rights may render shareholder
civil rights activism less effective. 232 Greyhound and other
companies during the Civil Rights Era did not immediately change
their policies in response to the Proxies Campaign. 233 Common
228. Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L. 217, 242
(2018).
229. See JP Dallman, Impact Investing, Just a Trend or the Best Strategy to
Help Save Our World?, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2018, 7:49 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/jpdallmann/2018/12/31/impact-investing-just-a-trend-or-the-best-strategyto-help-save-our-world/ (last visited July 16, 2019) (describing those interests as
financial as well as social and environmental) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
230. See, e.g., Andy Kiersz & Portia Crowe, These Charts Show Just How
White and Male Wall Street Really Is, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 25, 2015, 9:40 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/wall-street-bank-diversity-2015-8 (last visited
July 16, 2019) (finding in 2015 that “80% of executives at Goldman Sachs, Wells
Fargo, JPMorgan, Bank of America, Citigroup, and Morgan Stanley were white”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
231. Id.
232. See Lin, supra note 161, at 1585 (discussing how unpopular issues will
likely be ignored as a corporation “picks and prioritizes social-political causes”).
233. See supra notes 4–16 and accompanying text (noting the campaign’s
origin and strategy).
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excuses for certain businesses and municipalities’ acquiescence to
segregation were economic; that is, lost revenues and alienation of
their white customer base. 234 They were effectively claiming that
they were not racist, but a majority of their customers and
constituents were. And they often discounted the power of the
black purse. Charles Hamilton Houston of the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund thought economics and financial strain would
eventually aid the cause because public actors might go bankrupt
when forced to meet the equalization requirements of Plessy v.
Ferguson. 235 The impact of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, which
brought Martin Luther King, Jr. to national prominence, was
economic 236—about 70% of Montgomery bus passengers were
African American237—and James Peck argued that segregation
had negative economic consequences because Greyhound
customers, who experienced segregation, would bring expensive
lawsuits. 238 Civil rights activists were right about both the
economic and societal costs. Segregation was neither rational,
morally justified, nor economically sensible.
4. Mixed Motives
Impact investors still want financial returns along with their
social influence. 239 These mixed motives reflect conflicts. The basic
formula—shareholder return on investment equals financial
return plus social impact—hides complications. How much
234. See Lin, supra note 161, at 1541 (explaining it was common for
corporations to engage in segregation “out of ‘local custom’”).
235. See Simmons, supra note 212, at 181–82 (describing the successful
economic argument for desegregation that Houston pioneered).
236. See Kennedy, supra note 214, at 1054 (describing the boycott’s economic
pressure on local businesses, which quickly “broke ranks” with segregative
policies).
237. See id. at 1020, 1022 (during the Montgomery Bus Boycott “[u]pwards of
ninety percent of the black, bus-riding population—some 40,000
Negroes—honored the plea to stay off the buses”).
238. See Marens, supra note 4, at 382 (examining Peck’s economic arguments
for desegregation).
239. See Lin, supra note 161, at 1585–86, 1589 (“While many corporations
have become more socially responsible, corporations and the laws that govern
them do not focus on social externalities but on profits for shareholders. This focus
will naturally constrain some of their most noble social impulses.”).
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financial return do investors want and are they willing to tolerate:
one percent, five percent, ten percent? Should businesses prioritize
social impact or financial concerns? An intertemporal perspective,
allowing companies to prioritize financial concerns at one time and
social concerns at another, may be prudent. The former may
potentiate the latter.
5. Definitional and Measurement Challenges
Despite desiring a social impact, investors may have difficulty
defining and measuring it. For example, what does social impact
related to civil rights look like? Does it change representation at a
specific company or industry-wide, including directors, the c-suite,
employees, suppliers, products, and advertising? Alternatively, is
it about company financial support or sponsorship for advocacy
organizations that work to advance minority rights?
Methodologies for determining social impact and ESG ratings are
emerging but without a consensus. 240 Perhaps a preferred
standard will emerge from proxy advisers like Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis. 241 However, advisory
240. See Adam Bendell, Impact Investors Fail to Measure Negative Outcomes:
A “Positive Net Impact” Approach Would Take Account of Inevitable Unwanted
Effects, FIN. TIMES (May 12, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/8ffb4e56-546d11e9-8b71-f5b0066105fe (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (emphasizing the need for
impact investment rhetoric separating “values alignment” (assets reflecting
shareholder values) from “impact creation” (deploying assets to solve global
issues)) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Global Launch:
Operating Principles for Impact Investment, WBG INT’L FIN. CORP. (Apr. 12, 2019),
http://www.ifc/org/wps/wcm/connect/76e6607a-11a4-4ae-a36c7116b3dab3/impactprinciples_booklet_final_web_4-12-19.pdf?mod=aj[eres (“The
question for many investors is how to grow the level of investments targeting
impact. Despite the increased interest in and number of product launches
claiming to be impact investments, there is no common discipline for how to
manage investments for impact and the systems needed to support this.”).
241. See CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., A CALL FOR CHANGE IN THE PROXY ADVISORY
INDUSTRY STATUS QUO: THE CASE FOR GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY 15 (2011),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ProxyAdvisoryWhitePaper020
72011.pdf (describing the development of ISS and Glass Lewis). Compare Ike
Brandon & Jared Whitley, Corporate Governance Oversight and Proxy Advisory
Firms, 41 REG. 18, 20 (2018) (arguing that proxy advisors wield too much power,
especially through their “[e]fforts to push environmental, socially responsible, and
good governance priorities via proxy battles”), with George W. Dent Jr., A Defense
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firm guidance and ratings have been criticized for their sometimes
tenuous link to corporate performance, 242 and these critiques are
likely to intensify in the context of ESG questions. 243
IV. Implications
The Civil Rights Era legacy of Belton v. Gebhart and the noble
efforts of Louis Redding, Jack Greenberg, Chancellor Collins Seitz,
Pierre S. du Pont, Bayard Rustin, and James Peck illustrate that
advancing civil rights requires a range of tactics that leverage
public, private, and philanthropic resources. Shareholder activism
will work best as part of a multipronged strategy, not as a
substitute for other types of activism. It is certainly bold in the
sense that it seeks a recalibration of corporate institutional
arrangements and priorities. It is prudent in recognizing corporate
power and its ability to influence society as well as the limitations
of other advocacy venues. On the other hand, even if shareholder
activists can help to advance the modern civil rights agenda, their
willingness to do so remains uncertain.
The history and legacy of Belton v. Gebhart reveal the complex
challenges associated with advancing civil rights. Modern
scholars, practitioners, stakeholders, and observers must consider
of Proxy Advisors, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1287, 1307 (2014) (arguing that claims
of proxy advisor power are exaggerated and that limiting the current powers of
proxy advisors would have several negative consequences).
242. See CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., supra note 241, at 58–59 (describing the
prevalence of inaccuracies in proxy advising firms’ reports); Robert M. Daines et
al., Rating the Ratings: How Good are Commercial Governance Ratings?, 98 J.
FIN. ECON. 439, 439 (2010) (“Commercial ratings do not predict
governance-related outcomes with the precision or strength necessary to support
the bold claims made by most [proxy advisory and corporate governance rating
firms].”).
243. See Jennifer Thompson, ‘Green’ Funds Can Fall Short of Buyers’
Expectations: Investors Call for Greater Clarity on Products’ Credentials, FIN.
TIMES (May 12, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/644c1ec4-39d9-11e9-998828303f70fcff (last visited July 16, 2019) (“Investors often raise an eyebrow when
looking at a fund’s marketing blurb and underlying assets side by side. . . . [S]ome
suggest [greenwashing] will become more prevalent as managers come under
pressure to take advantage of surging interest in investing sustainably, or to
adhere to more stringent [ESG] principles.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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key questions about shareholder activism and civil rights,
particularly with respect to the ESG movement: 244
1. Who measures ESG impact and how?
2. Is the desired impact related to a specific corporation’s
operations or broader systems or both?
3. Is ESG largely a disclosure-based regime, consistent with
the market paradigm?
4. Is ESG simply one activist tool among many?
5. Do we want greater public accountability through
traditional democratic bodies than shareholder activism
offers?
6. Does ESG as presently conceived downplay or enhance the
importance of democratic venues for activism?
Future research on these important questions and others will
deepen our understanding of ESG-related shareholder activism
and its potential to advance civil rights in the contemporary
context.

244. See generally Peter Adkins, Marc Gerber & Richard Grossman, Making
Sense of the Current ESG Landscape, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE &
FIN. REG. (Oct. 18, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/18/makingsense-of-the-current-esg-landscape/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2019) (emphasizing the
need for boards of directors and management of public companies to understand
and adapt to the increasing prominence of ESG factors) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).

